



# Aurora Vulnerability

## *Issues & Solutions*

## *Hardware Mitigation Devices (HMDs)*

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
# Outline

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- Introduction.
  - Aurora definition.
  - Idaho National Lab demonstration.
- Aurora Alert:
  - Mitigation & report.
- Reliability Assessment of HMDs:
  - Test methodology.
  - Simulation results.
- Conclusion.

# What is Aurora?

- NERC's definition:
  - Aurora is a “gap in protection”.
- Aurora characteristics:
  - Out-of-synch, open/close sequence of 1 or more breakers.
  - Induced torques can cause permanent damage to the generator.
  - Open/close as fast as 10 to 15 cyc, i.e., traditional protection will not trip (gap).
  - Physical/Cyber attack.



# Idaho National Lab demonstration

- March 2007 Demonstration:
  - 3.8 MVA diesel generator operated at 60% rated power.
- Damage:
  - 13 iterations: abnormal vibrations.
  - 22 iterations: smoke.
- Traditional Gen protection:
  - Synch-check (25) disabled.



# Aurora Alert

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- **New alert issued October 13, 2010**
  - Requires responses by December 13, 2010; June 13, 2011; and every six months until fully mitigated
- Alert allows for engineering judgment.
- 1) Protection and Control Engineering Practices.
  - Hardware Mitigation Devices (“fence line solution”).
- 2) Electronic and Physical Security:
  - Access control.
  - Monitoring and reporting.
  - Training.
  - Personnel risk assessment.
  - Information protection. <sup>5</sup>

# Hardware Mitigation Devices (HMDs)

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- HMDs:
  - Relays specifically designed to mitigate Aurora.
  - Evaluated 2 commercially available relays, and a third custom solution.

# Reliability assessment: methodology

- Reliability: Security/Dependability
- RTDS: Closed-loop testing.
- Four highly detailed models:
  - Strong and weak zones in DVP.
  - Different topology & load flow.
  - Machine sizes and inertia and load characteristics.



# Reliability assessment: methodology

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- Test set applied to each model:

Category A	Category B	Category C	Category D	Category E
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Aurora: <math>BC_{GEN}</math></li><li>▪ Aurora + <math>\Delta f</math></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Adjacent line switch.</li><li>▪ Sustainable island.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Faults &amp; reclosing.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Non-linear load.</li><li>▪ Cap bank switch</li><li>▪ Load switch</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Black Start</li></ul>





# Reliability assessment: results

- Summary:

	Category A	Category B	Category C	Category D	Category E
HMD-1	FAIL	PASS	PASS	PASS	FAIL
HMD-2	FAIL	FAIL	PASS	PASS	PASS
HMD-3	FAIL	FAIL	PASS	PASS	PASS

# Risks: UCTE example

- UCTE event 2006: HMDs could have exacerbated the disturbance.



# Conclusion: HMD Reliability

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- Aurora:
  - High Impact Low Frequency event (HILF).
  - Mitigation solution must not interfere with, compromise, or jeopardize, the operation of the power system.
- RTDS testing methodology:
  - Detailed Models.
  - Comprehensive test: normal & abnormal system states.
- Reliability assessment:
  - Evaluate all possible solutions (e.g. reclosing timer, synch check)
  - HMDs are not dependable, nor secure.

# Questions?



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